Woman C.P.A.
Volume 40

Issue 1

Article 5

1-1978

Change To LIFO: Management appraises the results
Ruth Bullard

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/wcpa
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Bullard, Ruth (1978) "Change To LIFO: Management appraises the results," Woman C.P.A.: Vol. 40 : Iss. 1 ,
Article 5.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/wcpa/vol40/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Woman C.P.A. by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please
contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

According to a study by Copeland,
Wojdak and Shank, three solutions to
the LIFO dilemma were suggested.

Change To LIFO
Management appraises the results.

First, those companies in positive
profit-difference industries can use
LIFO for accounting purposes and
FIFO for tax purposes.

Second, businesses that face rising
prices and elect LIFO for tax savings
can disclose the negative profit
difference in their financial
statements...
Finally, under some circumstances,
LIFO may be used for tax purposes
by a subsidiary’s operations on a
recomputed FIFO basis.2
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Inflation rose to double digits in 1974,
a phenomenon which was accompanied
by high interest rates, high levels of in
ventory, and production and capacity
shortages. These factors combined to
create a unique and difficult climate in
which businesses had to operate. In an
attempt to deal with this climate, many
corporations adopted the last-in, first
out (LIFO) inventory accounting
method to remove the “inventory
profits” caused by inflation, and to
reduce income taxes. The corollary
against these benefits derived from
LIFO is that, due to the requirement of
Internal Revenue Code Section 472 (c),
if LIFO is used for tax purposes it must
also be used for reporting — thus,
lowering reported earnings.
Concurrent with the above events,
common stock equities were experien
cing one of the worst markets since the
1930s. With the high rate of inflation, it
seemed a prime time to make the switch
to LIFO. In fact, some of the financial

media1 expressed a belief that intelligent
investors would react with favor to an
adoption of LIFO.
What have been the results of this
switch in accounting methods? Has the
impact been as dramatic to corporate
profits and tax revenues as theorists and
politicians claimed it would be? What
criteria influenced management
decisions and, in retrospect, is manage
ment satisfied with their decisions? The
study reported herein gives answers to
some of these questions.
Historical Perspective of LIFO
In years past accounting disclosure
rules as provided by APB Opinions 20
and 28, FASB Statement 3, and ASR
159, required that all details of LIFO
switch be reported including the
differences in earnings resulting from
the change in accounting methods, thus
providing sufficient data for the market
analyst to make comparisons on the
basis of what the earnings would have
been without the switch.

Although all these recommendations
are consistent with the above mentioned
accounting disclosure rules, only the
first solution is practical for those
relatively few industries in which such
characteristics exist. With the release of
Rev. Rul. 73-57 usefulness of the third
solution was severely restricted. Then,
the publication of Rev. Rul. 74-586 im
posed stringent constraints on the
amount and kinds of information dis
closed, thus diluting the advantages
cited in the second solution suggested.
While it is recognized that Revenue
Rulings are the lowest in rank order of
the IRS rulings, these two rulings have
been effectively enforced by threat of
negation of the LIFO election.
Prior to 1974 few companies had
adopted LIFO usage; 16 percent of the
Fortune 500 industrials were using
LIFO as their principle method of in
ventory costing in 1974. Also, one-third
of the corporations electing LIFO
applied it in combination with other
methods. It appears then that businesses
had been very reluctant to use LIFO,
perhaps because of the controversy sur
rounding the method or perhaps
because of the drop in earnings that
must be reported in a year of adoption.
Yet, such a reason is contrary to the
“efficient market hypothesis.” Em
pirical evidence exists that supports the
“efficient market hypothesis”3; and,
there also is some evidence of a growing
acceptance of the validity of the
theory.4. It is theorized that the informa
tion derived from earnings flows, as they
affect intrinsic stock values, will be dis
counted by the market; and, although
lags may exist, the capital market is
relatively efficient though not perfectly
efficient. If the efficient market
hypothesis works, then the
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sophisticated user of accounting infor
mation should have discounted the
reported drop in earnings generated by
application of an accounting method.
Perhaps corporate managers failed to
have confidence in the automatic
market adjustment to the reported data.
This lack of confidence may have been
due to several studies whose results are
not consistent with the efficient markets
hypothesis, at least in its semi-strong
form5.
Study Procedure
Using the May 1974 Fortune 500 list,
two types of companies were isolated:
firms already using principally LIFO for
their inventories in 1973; and firms
which adopted LIFO during their fiscal
1974. This survey provided 166 com
panies in twenty-nine industries —
classification according to Standard &
Poors. The earnings and taxes of these
companies were then examined to deter
mine the effect of the LIFO change. The
basic hypotheses of the study were that
the influences triggering the switch to
LIFO were: 1) the need for cash, 2) the
desire to remove “illusory inventory
profits” from the reported earnings, 3)
the extremely poor performance of the
equity market, and 4) the impetus added
by other corporations in the same in
dustry adopting LIFO. To test these
assumptions, a questionnaire was sent
to the controller or financial vicepresident of each firm. In order to ob
tain adequate response, the question
naire was deliberately simplified. A
response rate of 66 percent was obtained
which represents 110 firms responding
(with 108 usable questionnaires), an ex
ceptionally high rate for mail question
naire replies.
LIFO’S Impact
on Earnings and Taxes
Of the 166 companies in the Fortune
500 that switched some portion of their
inventories to LIFO during 1974, 16
companies were already using LIFO
principally and were extending this use,
119 began to use LIFO principally, and
32 continued to use either FIFO or
average cost principally but switched a
significant portion of their inventories
to LIFO. Thirty of the 500 companies in
the survey did not reveal their inventory
pricing data in published statements in
1973 or 1974.6
The adoption of LIFO by these com
panies lowered total earnings by $2.8
billion or an average 16 percent decrease
(Exhibit 1). Four of the corporations in
curred losses which would not have been
incurred if they had not changed to
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LIFO and two companies increased
their losses. The largest dollar impact on
a single firm’s earnings was on Dow
Chemical whose earnings were lowered
by $271 million. The largest percentage
reduction of 172 percent was incurred
by Roper Corporation, which reported
a loss due to the change over. The
highest percentage impact for a com
pany which did not incur a loss was 96
percent for Scott Paper. The switch
caused earnings reductions of over 50
percent for thirteen companies in the
sample, while another thirty firms had
reductions in excess of one-third. Also,
for the companies adopting LIFO for a
significant portion but retaining
another method for the majority of their
inventories, the results were as
dramatic.
The average tax saving and conse
quent increase in cash flow was $7.1
million. Dow Chemical again scored the
largest dollar impact with a tax saving of
$127,919,000. It is apparent that the
adoption of LIFO was dramatic both in
terms of earnings reductions and tax
savings.

Results of the Questionnaire
Following are the responses to the
questionnaire which was used to deter
mine the influences affecting
management’s decision to adopt LIFO
and their opinions regarding their deci
sion for adoption.
Management’s Thoughts on Industry
Use of LIFO
Management’s appraisal of the use of
LIFO is revealed by the response to
Question No. 3, as shown in Exhibit 1.

EXHIBIT 1
RESPONSES TO QUESTION NO. 3

Do you feel that it would be beneficial
for all the companies in your industry to
use LIFO?
Yes
No
Not necessarily
Probably
Most have
No answer
Other comment

51
15
6
3
7
10
16
108

LIFO Use by Industry
Previous studies7 have found that
LIFO was particularly effective for in
dustries in which profits were sensitive
to price increases. This study bears out
the previous findings. For example, in
the textile industry, in 1973 only five of
the twelve companies were principally
using LIFO. Three of the five extended
their use of LIFO in 1974 and another
three switched predominately to the use
of LIFO, bringing to eight the number
valuing their inventories principally by
the LIFO method.
Three other industries not mentioned
in prior studies had significant LIFO
adoptions in 1974. The most striking
change was in the tire and rubber in
dustry. Of the six companies in this
study, only one used LIFO primarily in
1973, yet five of the six were using LIFO
primarily by the end of fiscal 1974. The
chemical industry also had a large
number of conversions to LIFO, from
two of the total of thirty-three using it in
1973 to twenty-three using LIFO by the
end of fiscal 1974. Interestingly, the in
dustry which began the use of LIFO, the
petroleum industry, had only thirteen of
its twenty-eight companies
predominately on LIFO in 1973, but
twenty-two were using LIFO principally
and another two had switched their
domestic inventories to LIFO complete
ly by the end of fiscal 1974.

Surprisingly this question generated
many comments, and it was also the
most unanswered question. Thirteen of
the comments dealt with the effect of the
individual nature of a company’s situa
tion on the decision, six of the
respondents felt that LIFO would be
beneficial for comparative purposes,
and five companies felt that LIFO is
beneficial in general due to the present
business situation.
It is important to note that these
responses were from top level manage
ment, i.e., either the controller or finan
cial vice president. Obviously, as these
companies are among the 500 largest in
dustrial firms, many of them are highly
diversified and cannot really be
classified as being in one industry. There
was no consensus on Question No. 3.
Many managements demonstrated that
the switch to LIFO is a highly in
dividualized decision, depending upon a
company’s pricing methods,
capabilities, economic circumstances
and the timing of the switch.
Influences on the LIFO Decision
As can be seen from the previous find
ings, the adoption of the LIFO inven
tory method of accounting can produce
tremendous tax savings. Numerous
authorities8 have felt that tax benefits
were the only reasons for the use of
LIFO.

EXHIBIT 2
RESPONSES TO QUESTION NO. 1

Which of the following choices describes the reason(s) your company
switched to LIFO in 1974? Please rank your choice if more than one is
appropriate.
Reasons

First

Second

Fourth

Third

15
46
19
“a”
4
14
16
“b”
“c”
22
25
7
4
“d”
0
2
“e”
2
0
0
0
3
0
“a&c”
0
16
“b&c”
7
0
7
0
“a&b&c”
a) More accurate measurement of real profit
b) Possible reduction in income tax liability.
c) Cash flow improvement
d) Switch to LIFO by other companies in your industry.
e) Other (please specify).
The first question in the questionnaire
was an attempt to determine to what ex
tent the tax savings and the consequent
increased cash flow led to the adoption
of LIFO in 1974 and to what extent the
companies were influenced by other fac
tors, such as the desire to express ear
nings without “illusory inventory
profits” and the impetus to change by
the switch of other companies in the
same industry.
Although the tax savings inherently
leads to increased cash flow, the two fac
tors were separated because of the
differences in terminology and possibly
by differences in motivation.

As can be seen, the more accurate
measurement of real profit was the most
pervading influence as eighty companies
found it to have influenced their deci
sion, while fifty-four firms found the
increased cash flow to have affected
their decision and thirty-four were
influenced by the reduced tax liability.
Significantly, despite the lemming
like appearance of LIFO adoptions in
some industries, only ten firms respond
ed that the switch to LIFO by others in
their industries had influenced their
decision.
Another interesting finding is that not
one company designated the “reduction
in tax liability” to be the only influence.
This is true despite the fact that 18
firms indicated the “more accurate
measurement of real profit” to be the
only influence and seven companies in
dicated “the increased cash flow” as the

only influence. Of course, since so many
companies in public discussions have
tried to play down the importance of the
tax benefits in order not to incur the
righteous wrath of politicians, it is
realistic to recognize that prudence
guided their responses.
The Stock Market’s Influence
Question No. 4 was included to deter
mine if the 1974 bear market affected the
decisions of management.
EXHIBIT 3
RESPONSES TO QUESTION NO. 4
Did the poor price performance of the
equities in the stock market in 1974 in
fluence your decision to switch to
LIFO?

Yes
No
No answer

12
94
2
108

Of the twelve which stated that the
poor performance of the market did
affect their decision, three qualified
their answer by stating that it was a very
minor consideration. One respondent
said, “To a limited extent we were in
fluenced by our analysis in that a
decrease in earnings due to LIFO would
not have an adverse impact on our stock
price.”9 Another manager stated that
the bear market “provided the oppor
tunity to switch to LIFO and gain tax
savings without further impairing P/E
ratio.”10 Two firms responded with the
common belief that they felt their firm’s

0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0

stock price could not get much lower,
and hence, the switch. Several com
panies also commented that the adop
tion of LIFO had not caused a negative
reaction to their stock prices.
Of the ninety-four companies who
responded that the low equity prices had
not affected their decision to adopt
LIFO, four did remark that the stock
market had been a minor consideration
and three companies stated their belief
that the stock market would respond
favorably to LIFO. Another company
that responded negatively did consider
the stock market but “determined there
would be no significant effect.”11
The responses to this question refuted
our premise that the bear market was a
leading influence on adoptions of LIFO.
Management’s Evaluation of LIFO in
Retrospect
As the use of the LIFO inventory
method of accounting involves substan
tially more record-keeping and is a more
complex method than FIFO or average
cost, an effort was made to determine if
the firms which adopted LIFO had
found that the mechanical problems
outweigh the benefits; or, whether LIFO
had lived up to management’s expec
tations.
EXHIBIT 4
RESPONSES TO QUESTION NO.2
In retrospect, are you satisfied with the
switch to LIFO?
Yes
107
No
1
108
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From the comments of the
respondents, it can be said that although
LIFO has accomplished its objectives,
the side effects of its use are causing
problems. Examples include the dif
ficulty of estimating and reporting in
terim earnings, the difficulty of making
internal analyses of segments of their
businesses and the tremendous effort for
data processing departments.
Due to the operational problems, it
had been expected that more firms
would be dissatisfied with LIFO. The
consensus of the respondents seems to
be summed up by one comment which
stated: “The computational and
accounting ‘mechanics’ of LIFO are
quite complex; however, the cash flow
benefits seem well worth the effort.”12
Percentage of Inventories on LIFO
As accounting for LIFO inventory is
a complex and costly procedure, it
would seem that changing only a por
tion of the inventories to LIFO would
create more problems than a complete
change over. In an attempt to determine
if there were any significant differences
in degree of satisfaction between those
companies changing the major portion
and those changing only a small portion
of their inventories, questions No. 5 and
No. 6 were posed. As only one firm ex
pressed dissatisfaction with LIFO, such
differences could not be determined.
Despite the lack of possible cor
relations, there were several interesting
aspects to the responses to these two
questions. Seventy-six of the
respondents were using LIFO for less
than 10 percent of their inventory in
1973, with sixty-one of these companies
having no LIFO inventories. Only seven
companies were using LIFO for over 50
percent of their inventory in 1973 and
only one of these used LIFO for 90 per
cent or more. Yet, in 1974, seventy-eight
percent of the respondents changed over
half of their inventory to LIFO.
Additional Thoughts of Management
on LIFO
To gain insight into any additional
problems, benefits, and/or thoughts
about the LIFO inventory accounting
method, a question was included re
questing “Additional Comments.”
All of the comments in this section
dealt with the tax laws, with several of
the comments dealing with the Internal
Revenue Service’s nondisclosure laws.
In fact, one firm felt that it could not
answer the questionnaire at all because
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it might jeopardize their LIFO election,
one felt that it could not reveal its name
because of the IRS nondisclosure rules,
while others felt that the IRS should be
compelled to change its position on the
nondisclosure rule after a year of
change.

Conclusions and Comments
One-third of the 500 largest com
panies switched to the LIFO inventory
method of accounting in 1974. The
effects of such a switch in accounting
methods on the 166 companies studied
was a reduction in earnings of $2.8
billion and the generation of a tax sav
ing and consequent increase in cash
flows of $1.18 billion.
The primary cause of the 1974 adop
tions of LIFO cited by management was
the more accurate measurement of real
profit. The need for cash flow, a com
mon problem in periods of inflation,
was indicated by management as a ma
jor influence thus supporting our
premise to this effect. The reduction of
tax liability was third in ranking of
reasons for their adoption of LIFO.
The premise that one impetus of the
switch was that other corporations in
the industry were switching was not
borne out by the study. Also, little sup
port was found for the hypothesis that
the prime instigation was the poor
performance of the equity market.
Discovery of industry trends not
found in previous studies included
significant LIFO adoptions in the tire
and rubber industry, where five of the
six companies were primarily using
LIFO by the end of fiscal 1974. Another
new industry highlighted by this study
was chemicals. The chemical industry
produced the greatest number of com
panies adopting LIFO, the largest dollar
reductions to earnings, and the greatest
total tax saving of any industry in the
survey. This industry also provided the
company, Dow Chemical, with the
greatest individual impact in the survey.
The third new industry found by the
study was the machinery industry.
Although the number of changes to
LIFO has slowed since 1974, the ap
parent long-term trend toward rising
price levels and high interest rates con
tinues to make LIFO an attractive alter
native. The satisfaction of those com
panies that have adopted LIFO also
adds to the continuing importance of
LIFO for corporate management.

Editorial Note: Tabulation is available
showing the impact on earnings and taxes
for the 166 companies that switched to LIFO
in 1974, and which were the basis of the
foregoing analysis. Interested readers may
obtain the tabulated data direct from the
authors.
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